Transitions are messy: lessons from Spain and a law change in Venezuela’s TSJ

The useful part

History later proved that the king had the information and political acumen to know that this was the right person, as indeed he was. Juan Carlos I had assumed the head of state position upon the death, in 1975, of Francisco Franco, as the dictator himself had stipulated. The king's political decision was that the regime itself should dismantle the regime.

How it works

• Adolfo Suárez's Law for Political Reform repealed the seven fundamental laws that institutionally sustained Francoism and opened the door to a new legal framework for the transitional process.
• In other words, to use the legal framework of the Franco regime to institutionally dismantle Francoism.
• In short, the Law repealed the seven fundamental laws that institutionally sustained Francoism and opened the door to a new legal framework for the transitional process.
• In any case, it is worth clarifying that the Spanish case may have some similarities, but also significant differences, with what the transition in Venezuela might entail.
• When the process is fraught with such decisions and concessions, it is difficult to understand how these decisions can ultimately benefit the transition.

What to take from it

At the time, naturally, there was distrust in the process, because some sectors questioned whether it could end in a form of reinstitutionalization of Francoism. In Adolfo Suárez, a young politician who, with the support of the king and Fernández-Miranda, quickly rose through the ranks of the regime to become the first head of government after the resignation (subtly encouraged by the king) of Arias Navarro. Fernández-Miranda's appointment was met with frustration in some sectors, as he was seen as a faithful continuator of the regime, even though he was convinced that a political transition was necessary.

Example or evidence

• King Juan Carlos I's decision to appoint the relatively unknown Adolfo Suárez as PM caused genuine astonishment within the Franco regime, due to the perplexing nature of the selection.
• Only years later could its true significance be appreciated: a pertinent and crucial measure that ensured the transition process's success.
• A common element among the three figures is that, in their own way, they belonged to the Franco regime.
• In this case, the Law for Political Reform of December 17, 1976, drafted by Torcuato Fernández-Miranda at the request of the King and Suárez, was decisive.

Details worth keeping

Only then, the reasons why the regime fractured become clear, the motivations of those who held power for gradually handing it over to certain successors, or the personality traits of each of the previously opposing actors that allowed them to understand each other despite their differences. Thanks to these ex post facto discoveries, the outcome can be understood, and it can be said that the success of that transition was due to the fact that it was those particular people who "negotiated" a path to reach a transitional process. The Spanish example: the Law for Political Reform Fifty years ago, when the young King Juan Carlos I appointed Adolfo Suárez as Prime Minister of Spain, the virtually unanimous conclusion was that he had made a serious political error.

Related coverage

• Stuff: How hard is it to achieve change through politics? It's a question frequently asked by members of the public, sometimes with a hint of scepticism but most often simply curiosity.
• Realclearpolitics: Trump-a-Palooza Is Over. Now Comes the Hard Part
• Caracaschronicles: Project Umbral has been tracking the process through 60 indicators, 11 pillars, and an 18-month roadmap