Letters: The far right’s rise reflects political failures in the centre as much as external forces

# Overview Three letters published in The Guardian argue that the rise of far-right parties in Europe can be traced in large part to choices made by the political centre over several decades. The writers link weakened worker protections, expanded economic insecurity, failed institutional reckoning in Germany, and contested policing strategies to the current surge in support for parties such as Alternative für Deutschland (AfD).

# What the writers say about the liberal centre

# Germany's longer trajectory

# Public order and street mobilisation William Ward's letter turns to the street, citing recent intimidating demonstrations in Dover and Portsmouth. He references the Public Order Act 1936, which historically curtailed quasi-military demonstrations, and asks whether similar legal tools can be used to prevent balaclava-clad, intimidating protests today. Ward's point is procedural and legal: existing statutes might be applicable to contemporary public-order threats if authorities are willing to use them.

# How these arguments relate to broader coverage The letters respond to commentary warning about external threats to liberal democracy—such as MAGA-style politics and Kremlin influence—by emphasising internal, structural causes. The writers do not deny external influences but stress that the liberal centre's policy choices and institutional failures are major contributors to the political environment in which far-right parties thrive.

# Practical implications If the letters' diagnoses are accepted, policy responses would focus less on purely defensive measures against foreign influence or isolated extremist actors and more on reversing long-term socioeconomic trends: rebuilding bargaining power and social protections, reconfiguring public services to reduce inequality, engaging more genuinely with historical reckoning, and applying existing public-order laws to prevent intimidation on the streets.

# Closing The letters present a case that blame for the far-right rise cannot be limited to foreign interference or sudden political shocks. Instead, they call attention to decades of policy choices and institutional practices that widened social fracture and left openings for extremist parties to expand their influence.