Even If “Operation Economic Outcast” Succeeds, It Wouldn’t End the War

# What the author grants for the sake of argument

The piece begins by accepting a hypothetical: suppose "Operation Economic Outcast" succeeds and state collapse happens in Iran within months. The author grants that premise to evaluate the immediate and medium-term consequences, rather than debate whether the economic campaign will work.

# The likely internal fallout

Even a rapid collapse would not produce unanimous opposition to the existing regime. Estimates cited in the piece put active support for the Islamic Republic at roughly 15 to 30 percent. That residual backing makes a neat transition improbable.

A collapsed central authority would probably lead quickly to civil war. Possible combatants include hardline remnants of the IRGC, other IRGC or regular army factions that align with new political actors, and revolutionary groups that split over the future of the state. The author also points out the risk of infighting among revolutionary factions, similar to internal conflicts after Iran's 1979 revolution.

# Separatism and external intervention

Peripheral separatist movements — especially violent Kurdish groups such as Komala and PJAK — would likely try to seize territory. Such unrest would likely trigger a Turkish military response, given Ankara's recent record of intervening against Kurdish armed groups. That dynamic could destabilize autonomous Iraqi Kurdistan and complicate regional security further.

# The regionalized nature of the war

# The costs of what comes next

The author notes U.S. politics and public sentiment as constraints: the appetite in Washington for massive foreign spending or renewed large-scale military deployments is limited. That means a successful campaign that "breaks" Iran could leave the region in chaos that the United States is politically and financially ill-equipped to fix.

# Why negotiation is the pragmatic route

Given the risks — internal war, territorial fragmentation, foreign occupations, continued proxy warfare, and large reconstruction needs — the author concludes that negotiated settlement remains the only realistic way to conclude the conflict on an acceptable political timetable. He points to the June memorandum of understanding as the most practicable framework to bridge gaps between combatants.

# Bottom line

Destroying or collapsing Iran by economic means might remove the current regime, but it would not be the end of fighting. Instead, it would likely mark the start of a prolonged, costly period of violence, fragmentation, and foreign intervention, making diplomatic compromise the least risky path to stability.