Advisory documents and workplace safety mandates that regulate conditions of operation rather than capping throughput do not constitute orders "limiting commerce." 2. Supply delays, increased costs, and capacity reductions do not equate to an operational suspension, particularly where a taxpayer maintains its workforce and revenues.
Advisory documents and workplace safety mandates that regulate conditions of operation rather than capping throughput do not constitute orders "limiting commerce." 2.
Supply delays, increased costs, and capacity reductions do not equate to an operational suspension, particularly where a taxpayer maintains its workforce and revenues.
Pead granted the government's partial motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, dealing a decisive blow to supply chain ERC claims predicated on generalized port delays...
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Advisory documents and workplace safety mandates that regulate conditions of operation rather than capping throughput do not constitute orders "limiting commerce." 2. Supply delays, increased costs, and capacity reductions do not equate to an operational suspension, particularly where a taxpayer maintains its workforce and revenues. Pead granted the government's partial motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, dealing a decisive blow to supply chain ERC claims predicated on generalized port delays and indirect workplace safety regulations.
Court articulated three independent, legal grounds for dismissal: 1. The statutory phrase "due to" in Section 2301(c)(2)(A)(ii)(I) of the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act) requires both factual (but-for) and proximate cause, barring claims linked through an attenuated supply chain.
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