A recent Delhi High Court case probes whether social media takedown and strike systems fit within Section 79’s safe harbour and the IT Rules after users contest complaints.
The Delhi HC in Saurabh Maurya v. John Doe is asking whether platform strike-and-termination practices align with Supreme Court precedents on intermediary liability.
Platform procedures that remove content on a complainant’s assertion, log strikes and terminate accounts raise a legal tension if the uploader contests the complaint.
Recent IT Rules amendments (2025–2026) changed wording around voluntary takedowns and broadened triggers for protection, leaving questions about post-contest removals unresolved.
# What this story is about Court is examining whether how platforms process copyright strikes, takedowns and account termination complies with the legal framework for intermediary protection under the Information Technology Act and recent IT Rules. The factual trigger is Saurabh Maurya v. John Doe, where an Instagram account was suspended after copyright strikes and later partially restored, and the plaintiff contends the platforms' procedures are unlawful.
# How platforms currently handle strikes
# The legal tension: neutrality vs. voluntary action
# What earlier judgments say Shreya Singhal v. Union of India read down Section 79(3)(b) to mean that an intermediary has "actual knowledge" only when a court order is passed requiring removal, so intermediaries are not to judge legitimacy of takedown requests. That decision limited intermediary discretion in blocking content without a judicial order, though the Court's construction was confined to unlawful acts relatable to Article 19(2) (copyright was not directly addressed there).
MySpace Inc. v. Super Cassettes Industries Ltd., a Delhi Division Bench decision, took a different approach for copyright: it held that specific knowledge provided by the rights holder identifying the infringing works and locations can be sufficient without a court order, and directed removal within 36 hours of a proper notice.
# The post-contest problem The core problem identified in the case and the article is this: an intermediary may act once on trust when a complaint first arrives, but once the uploader contests the complaint, the intermediary has no external authority to act on. If it continues to keep content down and record strikes based on its own judgment while asserting safe harbour, that raises a legal inconsistency with the passivity requirement of Section 79.
# IT Rules changes and the word "voluntary"
# Why the court question matters The Court framed a narrow legal question: are current suspension, takedown and deletion procedures for copyright strikes consistent with the principles in Shreya Singhal and MySpace? The answer will determine whether platforms can continue strike-based account termination and automated removals without stronger procedural safeguards when users contest claims.
# Practical implications If the court requires stricter limits, platforms may need to change post-contest workflows, slow automated strike accumulation, or require additional external verification before recording strikes or terminating accounts. Rights holders may need to rely more on court orders in contested cases. The ruling will affect how speech and dispute resolution operate on major social platforms.
In continuation of Part 1, this Part tests the arguments run by the Platforms where they state that – striking content upon complaint and terminating accounts with repeated complaints is due diligence which the IT Act and Rules requires. The Concept of a “Voluntary” Takedown The third proviso to Rule 3(1)(d), in force
The Delhi High Court (“DHC”), in the past month, has seen multiple ongoing cases where social media intermediaries’ copyright strike mechanism has come into question (see here and here). With social media platforms now serving as a principal forum for public expression, and a handful of platforms controlling access to
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